74 THE MESOPOTAMIA*? CAMPAIGN.

which,, during the next few months, was to strain the forti-
tude of the troops as highly as anything they had yet endured.
In a heat so scorching that men would climb out of the
furnace-like trenches and risk a bullet in order to escape the
baking walls; in a plague of flies; decimated by sickness;
oppressed by endless dull fatigues, the emptiness of the desert,
and, above all, the knowledge of failure and the sense of utter
Isolation from all familiar surroundings, British and Indian
suffered side by side.

On the Tigris, the opposing armies lay in close contact.
On the left bank, the Sannaiyat position—consisting of five
lines of wired trenches—blocked the narrow defile which lay
between the Suwaikiyeh Marsh and the river; behind San-
naiyat lay a series of prepared defences,, stretching back to
Kilt itself—sixteen miles away.

On the right bank, the enemy held the general line Sinn
Banks-Dujailah Bedoubt-Atab, which commanded a great
expanse of open desert, With his flanks secured against
manoeuvre, on the right by waterless desert and on the left
by an impassable marsh, with his deep trenches and his fine
field of fire, Khalil Pasha, the Turkish Commander,, was well-
placed—even had it been General Lake's intention to resume
the offensive.

General Lake, however, was compelled to devote his
whole energy to maintaining the Tigris Corps (some thirty
thousand fighting men) in its forward position and in supply-
ing the other scattered detachments of his army. For this task
his resources were inadequate; the heat was intense and the
sick-rate was appallingly high. Every fit man—and by <e fit"
is meant a man not sufficiently ill to " go sickf>—was doing
more than his own share of fatigues; consequently little or no
training could be carried out. Short of trained men, short
of transport, short of supplies,, the condition of the Tigris
Corps was lamentable.

Khalil Pasha was not slow to realise the situation. Hut
had fallen; he appreciated that there was nothing to tempt
General G-orringe to take action; and that so long as the
Turkish position at Sannaiyat prevented the passage of the
British supply-ships up the river and the Tigris Corps had
insufficient transport to allow it to move far from these ships,
it was practically impossible for the British to advance.

Meanwhile, in north-west Persia the Eussian advance
was being greatly hindered by shortage of supplies and
by difficult communications. Clearly, the moment was
favourable for Khalil to put into execution the very plan